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High-tech Brazil: Challenge of Local Innovation Systems 
 
Nobuaki Hamaguchi 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Brazil constitutes a group of a small number of developing countries exporting 
technology intensive products.  Table 1 includes technology intensive manufactured 
products such as aircrafts, automobiles, and cellular telephones.  The government 
initiatives in the past shaped the core part of the Brazilian aircraft technology, which was 
further sophisticated after the deep structural transformation and internationalization in 
the 1990s.  A privatized national company Embraer is the fourth largest aircraft producer 
competing for the third rank with Bombardier from Canada.   
 
It is to be also noted that even some primary products appearing to be natural resource 
based actually contain high technology contents.  Take soybeans as an example.  Soybean 
exports increase was made possible by expansion of plantation in the vast semi-arid 
inland area.   The national agricultural laboratories of EMBRAPA created biologically 
modified seeds and developed the method of optimum application of calcium to 
transform acid soil arable.  Consider also the case of petroleum.   Since most of crude oil 
reserves in Brazil are found in a deep sea, exploration projects require highly 
sophisticated search technology.  Petrobras, a national oil company, spent R$1.5 billion 
during 1995-2001 for research and development. (Petrobras, Relatório de Gestão 2002, 
p.23)   
 
On the other hand, in some cases high technology products may actually have little local 
technology contents.  Automobile industry in Brazil developed by foreign technology and 
local parts suppliers were also grown together.   Yet, in the climate of the liberalization in 
the 1990s multinational auto parts firms largely acquired competent local suppliers and 
others were replaced by imports.  In these events, local technological capability was 
considerably lost while increasing the dependence on foreign technologies.  Cellular 
telephone equipment exports have become significant only recently.  Since the import 
substitution of telecommunication equipment and informatics failed to establish 
electronic component industry, increasing exports of cellular telephones contain least 
local technological contents, provoking large volume of imports of parts and components 
at the same time.  Exports of foreign technology dependent products like automobiles and 
cellular telephones have been especially helped by devaluation of the real in recent years 
which encouraged multinational enterprises to utilize their production in Brazil as the 
export base to  neighboring countries.  Their competitiveness also depends on tax 
incentives offered in specific locations. These kinds of exports will not construct a solid 
basis of the export structure because multinational companies can easily switch their 
export platform from one country to another.             
           
In the era of the globalized economy, a semi-industrialized country like Brazil should 
facing a challenge to increase own technological capability.  Although there is no doubt 
to say that the national R&D efforts have already made significant contribution to 
widening exports variety, much more local R&D is required to have more solid and 
diversified export structure.   
 
Currently, the R&D expenditure in 2000 represented only 1.4% of GDP and 60% of them 
comes from the public sector (Figure 1).  This contrasts to the case of OECD countries 
where private enterprises’ expenditures account for 65-75% of the total R&D (OECD, 
Main Science and Technology Indicators).  The government is eager to stimulate private 
R&D and introduced at the federal level such measures as Fundos Setoriais (Sector 
Funds) managed by the FINEP – a science and technology development fund under the 
Ministry of Science and Technology.  Given that the financial constraint is the highest 
obstacle for private R&D, the funds has financing for R&D activities of private 
companies allocated to designated sectors as well as co-research projects with universities.  
In addition PDTI/PDTA (Program for Industrial/Agricultural Technology Development) 
established by Law 8661/93 and modified by Law 9532/97 provides tax incentive for 
R&D.  Most of beneficiaries of this program are large firms, including local subsidiaries 
of multinational firms.  The new Informatics Law (8248/91 and renewed by Lei 
10176/01) in turn provides tax incentives to R&D expenditures in area related to 
informatics technology.          
 
At local level incipient attempts are being made to help newly established technology 
based firms to grow by nursing in incubators.  According to the survey by National 
Association of Promoters of Advanced Technology Enterprises – ANPROTEC, there are 
currently 183 incubators in operation in Brazil, increasing from 12 in 1992.  Out of them 
147 are located in Southeast and South Region and 57% are considered as technology 
based ones.  47% are privately owned non-profit seeking and 42% are controlled by 
federal and local governments.  67% of them incubate less than 10 firms.  A half (49%) 
of incubated firms are of electronics-information technology – telecommunication 
complex and only 4% are of biotechnology.  47% of entrepreneurs own undergraduate 
degree and 21% received graduate education.  Many of these firms are originated from 
university research.   
 
It should be recalled that scientific production is intensely concentrated regionally.  Table 
2 indicates that almost 70-80% of graduate students in biology and engineering are 
located in Southeast region while other 15% are in South.  Naturally, technology based 
industrialization tend to agglomerate in these regions.          
 
While the federal level effort to ease the bottleneck of finance is considered vital, our 
argument here is to stress importance of taking geographical dimension of innovation.  
Namely we emphasize that in practice new ideas of production tend to emerge interaction 
of related agents and the facility of interaction has much to do with the distance among 
them.  Several scholars like Cassiolato & Lastre (2000) have developed a compelling 
argument justifying the concept of the local innovation system (LIS) in the Brazilian 
context, as an analog to the national innovation system idealized by Nelson (1996) and 
others.  According to them the local system will capture production linkage among firms 
and involvement of related agents other than firms themselves such as universities and 
other scientific research institutions, workers, local government, and civil societies, 
promoted by shorter inter agent distances.   
 
The concept of a LIS coincides with a cluster, which is a spatial concept of agglomeration 
of industries in particular location.  We consider LIS as a subset of a cluster, 
differentiating from other kind of cluster by its very nature of orientation toward creation 
of products and production methods that are new to the industry.  In contrast, a non-LIS 
type cluster is based on technologies either already locally standardized or adapted from 
outside.  Following Nelson (1996), information on technology is a public good in such 
places.  Firms do not compete trying to be differentiated from each other, but they 
collaborate to use the shared technology in most efficient way.  Thus, the centripetal 
force of agglomeration is the frequency of interaction among firms.  This type of cluster 
can be modeled in consistency with neoclassical perfect competition model: i.e., 
Q=A(N)f( . ) , where Q is the sector output, A is an increasing function of the size of local 
firms N capturing Marshallian externalities, and f( ) is a constant-to-return production 
function.   
 
In contrast, firms in LIS seek competitive advantage by enlarging technological 
differentiation to capture monopolistic rent, following the pattern of the Schumpeterian 
competition.  Such differentiation can be made by incorporating innovative scientific 
research results.  Unless such knowledge flows can be generated inside the firms, private 
interactions with universities or research institutes are imperative.  Even when R&D is 
internalized, firms should rely on supply of highly educated human resource produced by 
universities.  Thus, firms are attracted by accessibility to universities and research 
institutions.   
 
Such distinctions lead to different policy implication to local authorities.  In the case of 
non-LIS cluster, local governments are required to support institutions for sharing local 
knowledge such as local vocational training center, formation of chambers and 
cooperatives, and arrangement of subcontracting works.  For LIS cluster promotion of 
interaction between local academic institution and firms are most welcome, including 
joint research, matching of university researches and firm business interest, and spin-off 
of university researchers establishing their own companies.            
 
This paper consists of three case studies of the LIS type clusters representing different 
scenarios of industrial policy.  The first story is about the case of telecommunication 
equipment in Campinas of São Paulo State.  There, original national technology was 
developed under the government initiatives but as the result of disorganized privatization 
and market opening resulted in hollowing out of the major part of the previous efforts 
leaving only small niches of business.  However, the intensified competition has made the 
locational advantage of the region revaluated to become one of the most interesting 
places for technology-based multinational firms because of its strong academic and 
research base. The second example relates to the most successful case of aircraft industry 
in São Jose dos Campos of São Paulo State.  The initial strong government initiative 
played a decisive role in formation of sound technological basis and then with 
privatization the industry made successful transition to local private ownership with 
strategic alliance with foreign capitals.  The third case deals with emerging biotechnology 
industry in Belo Horizonte of Minas Gerais State.  Apart from the previous two cases, 
there was no government initiative even at the initial stage of its development.    Still, 
three have been some important development led by spin-off of university researchers.  
Firms are born small and struggle to grow bigger on the basis of their technological 
competitive edge.  Although local arrangements are being organized in systematic way 
and there is strong local political will to support, firm growth tend to be constrained by 
limited access to financing.  Such constraints may lead to convince them to sell off the 
developed technologies to multinational firms.             
          
II. Campinas – Telecom Equipment 
 
Brazilian telecommunication industry was restructured by the Telecommunication Law of 
1962 that put the national telecommunication system under the coordination of a federal 
agency.  Telebras was then created as the holding company of state level local telephone 
service companies and the long-distance call operator Embratel.  Telebrás exerted 
monopolistic power in procurement of equipments as a tool of industrial policy7.  Initially 
telecommunication equipments were supplied only by local subsidiaries of multinational 
firms such as Ericsson, NEC, and Equitel/Siemens.  Telebras promoted competition of 
the three firms by utilizing its monopsonic procurement power inducing them to bring the 
latest technology to Brazil.   
 
                                                             
7 The procurement policy was guided by the following principles: (i) diversification of suppliers in order to avoid 
monopolization or excessive fragmentation of the market; (ii) organization of purchases in clusters according to kind of 
equipment and geographical area they will be used in order to rationalize operation and maintenance; and (iii) planning 
the expansion of services within a five-year interval with the specification of the equipment to be ordered to allow the 
industry to organize production accordingly (Bastos, 1995: p.9). 
Later, Telebras gradually established an industrial policy to absorb foreign technology 
and substitute a part of market share by national brand.  It started an ambitious project 
targeting the development of the pulse code modulation component in 1973 recruiting 
professors of University of São Paulo.  This endeavor was pursued more systematically 
after the Telebrás’ creation of a research and development center CPqD (Centro de 
Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento) in 1976.  Activities of CPqD broadly varied from electronic 
switching, digital transmission, optical communication, data and text communication, and 
satellite communications.     
 
The location of CPqD was chosen in Campinas, located at 100 km to the north of the 
state capital.  The location choice was influenced by the existence of São Paulo State 
University of Campinas (Unicamp) founded n 1966, taking Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology as a model to create the center of excellency in research and graduate 
programs especially in hard sciences.  In the related area of electronics, and information 
and telecommunication technology, Unicamp embodied the Faculty of Electric 
Engineering and Computation (FEEC), and the Institute of Physics (know as Instituto de 
Física Greb Wataghin – IFGW) which developed intense interaction with CPqD.  
Moreover, Campinas has a Cathoric University (PUCCAMP), University of São 
Francisco (USF) and Campinas Technical School (COTUCA), a vocational education 
unit of Unicamp, offering specializing course in electronics and telecommunication.  
 
According to Dahlman and Frischtak (1993), in 1988 CPqD was the largest and most 
sophisticated applications laboratory in Latin America.  It employed 400 professionals 
directly engaged in R&D with about US$ 60 million of allocated budget.  Yet, for 
CPqD’s too broad activities without particular focus, the resource was not enough.  
Coupled with lost opportunities to take advantage of cheaper international technologies, 
government R&D efforts were considered slow and not very effective (Dahlman and 
Frischtak 1993: pp.437). 
 
CPqD established a joint-venture with a national private group Procom a manufacturing 
firm producing the locally developed commuation equipment Trópico.  An early models 
were put into practice in the 1980s but due to its limited capacity they were installed only 
in rural area.  After the introduction of high capacity model Trópico RA in 1991, Telebras 
preferentially procured it and by the mid 1990s, Trópico already divided almost equal 
market share with other multinationals. (Szapiro, 2000)  Today Trópico model 
commutation equipment is produced by Promom and also licensed to a French 
multinational Alcatel.    
 
 
CPqD was transformed into a private foundation following the privatization of Telebras 
in 1998 and its role of the integrator was lost. Yet, there is no doubt about that the 
presence of CPqD was a critical mass leading to a formation of the current local 
productive arrangement for technology based manufacturing in Campinas.  
 
First, the frequent interaction with CPqD marked strong characteristics in research and 
education orientation in local universities.  In Unicamp, FEEC 
(http://www.fee.unicamp.br/FEEC-nova/index2.htm) has over 100 professors in its 
eleven departments and its graduate program of has about 550 students in the field of 
industrial automation, biomedical, computer science, and application of electronics to 
microelectronics e optictronics, energy, telecommunication, and telemetric.  They 
produce more than 60 master degrees and 40 doctor degrees annually.  Their program is 
nationally renown as the only one that is given the highest grade of CAPES, the higher 
education evaluation office of the Ministry of Education.  Institute of Physics 
(http://www.ifi.unicamp.br/), with 94 professors and 186 graduate students and 458 
undergraduate students, confers 25 to 25 master and doctoral degrees annually.  Their 
graduate program also receives the highest grade of CAPES. 
 
Secondly, many local firms in the related business were born. Since 1973, IFGW has 
worked with CPqD for the development of optic telecommunication technology, leading 
to foundation of Xtal, the largest optic fiber producer in the domestic market.  Another 
case of spin-off was AsGa, founded by ex-director of IFGW aiming at production of 
optic-electronic component for electric/optic signal converter.  IFGW is recently 
implementing joint R&D projects in the advanced optic fiber technology with companies 
such as Ericsson which established a research center in Campinas.   From CPqD itself, 
one of its former researcher (and a graduate of IFGW, too) founded OptoLink, a producer 
of optic amplifiers and connectors.  The following is a partial list of Campinas-based 
local companies.   
 
Brazilian firms      
Art Craft Produtos Ópticos Ltda. New materials/ Optics  
Bioluz- Equipamentos e Serviços Ltda. New materials/ Optics  
Carel Indústria Óptica Ltda. New materials/ Optics  
Fausto Becca 
Fiber Work- Tecnologia de Comunicações Ópticas New materials/ Optics 
Fybercom 
Ideal Brasil 
LR Telecom 
Nalitel Telecomunicac. e Teleinformatica 
Neger Telecom 
Montmartre Produtos Ópticos Ltda. New materials/ Optics 
Optolink 
Darumatec Digital telephonic assistance systems 
Consórcio Tess Telecomunicações Telecommunications 
Emerson Electric do Brazil Ltda. 
AsGa Microeletrônica S.A. New materials/ Optics 
Redein Telecommunications 
Promon - Trópico Sistemas e Telecom. S.A. Telecommunications  
Celtec / Celplan Ltda. 
 
The Brazilian government reformed the Law of Informatics in 1991.  While the old law 
aimed to import-substitution by practically prohibiting imports of electronics parts, the 
new law changed aims to stimulate innovation in information technology related area by 
giving a firm tax reduction when it invest no less than 5% of its revenue in research and 
development.  Since 2.3% out of this can be spent for contracting research institution or 
university, demand for interaction with CPqD and Unicamp was stimulated.  Thus, 
telecommunication equipment producer such as Promon and Zetax  were concentrated in 
Campinas looking for proximity to CPqD. 
 
Thirdly, availability of skilled labor attracted a number of multinational firms of 
informatics and telecommunication equipment industry8.   
 
Telecommunication technology related foreign enterprises in located in Campinas area. 
Compaq do Brasil (Computing)        USA 
DEC (Computing)         USA 
                                                             
8 Other than telecommunication technology related, there are increasing localization of automobile industry in 
Campinas and its surroundings, such as Toyota, Honda, Mercedez-Bentz. 
IBM (Computing Research Center)       USA 
Hewlett- Packard Brasil S/A (Computing/ Bank automation)    USA 
Texas Instrumentos Eletrônicos do Brasil (Computing/ Electronic components)  USA 
Avex Electronics do Brasil (Computing/ Goods manufacture)    USA 
SCI Systems-Advanced Electronics Technologies (Computing/ Goods manufacture) USA 
GE Plastics (Blades and Cover)       USA 
FiberCore Inc/Xtal Fibras Ópticas S.A (New materials/ Optic Fibers)   USA 
Motorola do Brasil Ltda. (Telecommunications/ mobile telephony and pagers)  USA 
Nortel Comércio e Serviços Ltda. (System integration and data communication) Canada 
Fibercore Inc. (Telecommunication)      USA 
Lucent Technol Network Systems Brasil S/A (Telecommunication)    USA 
Alcatel Telecommunicacoes (Telecommunication)    France 
 
The concentration of high technology firms has also very much to do with the 
deregulation process.  Pricvatization of the telecommunication service abolished the 
monopsonic procurement power entitled to Telebás.  Newly installed telecommunication 
companies found the telecommunication infrastructure severely under-invested and 
operated under obsolete technology.  Such regulatory framework change created 
expectation for huge demand for equipment with the state-of-art technology. This paved 
the way to entry of foreign companies such as Alcatel, Lucent, Nortel and Cisco Systems.   
Most of them established local production because of tariff reduction in the early 1990s 
and the new law of informatics of 1991 liberalized imports of equipment and electronic 
parts.  Newly entered multinational firms do not engage in R&D but provoked large 
inflow of imports of parts.  Trade deficit of the sector reached to US$ 2 billions annually 
in 1996-2001.  (Oliva, 2002) 
 
Although regulatory framework change has led to expansion of the market and promoted 
internationalization of the telecommunication equipment industry, the sector increased 
dependence on foreign technology and autonomy of local innovation was lost9.  De Souza 
et.al (2001) considers that the new institutional framework contributed to attract foreign 
investment and new technology but reduced the degree of internalization of technology in 
the local production chain, contributing the significant part of the trade deficit, and reduce 
                                                             
9 De Souza et.al (2001) reports that CPqD’s difficulty after the privatization having to survive with small projects rather 
than long-term strategic ones like Tropico and training service to local enterprises which end up inducing outflow of 
personnel to such companies.  
the chance of spillover.  Porto et.al.(2000) also pointed out that the structural change in 
the 1990s provoked profound “dismantling” of the telecommunication equipment 
agglomeration.  
 
The regulatory reform gave profound impact on the local firms as well. CPqD was 
reestablished as a private consulting firm and lost the characteristics of the integrator of 
the local innovation system.  Several firms were acquired by foreign enterprises.  An 
American firm Fiber Core recently acquired Xtal (Xtal Fiber Core Brasil as it is now 
called).  Zetax was acquired by Lucent together with Batik of Minas Gerais in 1999.  As 
for the companies remaining in the market, Promon established manufacturing plant in 
Manaus, away from Campinas, seeking for tax incentive in the Free Zone.  Promon 
recently accepted a minority participation of Cisco Systems which still does not have its 
own local production unit in Brazil.  AsGa, one of CPqD spin-offs, could not compete in 
the electronic component market and sought to survive by switching specialization to 
produce equipment such as optic modem with imported parts.   
  
Although Campinas area is sometimes dubbed Brazilian Silicon Valley because of the 
high concentration of high technology based big names, Cassiolato et.al (2001) remarked 
that operations of these companies do not necessarily represent high technological 
intensity.  The new Informatic Law certainly give incentive to local R&D but since R&D 
is too broadly defined by the Ministry of Science and Technology to include workers 
training, international trips, adaptation of foreign products (so-called nationalization), and 
technical services, the current tax incentive scheme tend to distort toward such lower 
intensity  “R&D”.  Furthermore, while technology-based firms were attracted to 
Campinas area by the technological spillover of CPqD in the past, these new coming 
multinational firms are  attracted only by opportunities to hire well-educated workers 
than the technological dynamics that the region can offer through interaction of research 
and production.  Thus, as Diniz and Razavi (1999) worries, “Campinas will increase its 
role as an assembly platform with weak supply links to national and local industries.”  
Such scenario may depend on Brazilian market prospectives.  Companies such as Nortel 
and Motorola have announced an intention to establish research and development units in 
Campinas integrated in their global innovation network.       
 
III.  São Jose dos Campos 
 
São Jose dos Campos is also 100 Km away from the São Paulo State capital, yet to the 
east along the Dutra Highway connecting São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.  Not only the 
distance but the city also shares similar characteristics to Campinas.  Local innovation 
system of São José dos Campos is also based on establishment of MIT-modeled research 
center in 1945 – Centro Tecnológico Aeroespacial (Aerospace Technology Center), 
which was later complemented by establishment of a higher education institution Instituto 
Tecnológico de Aernáutica (ITA) in 1950 and a special research institute Aerospace 
Research Institute (Instituto de Pesquisas Espaciais, INPE) in 1961.  During the 1950s 
and 1960s, ITA became the most prestigious engineering school in Brazil (Diniz and 
Razavi, 1999: p.114)     
 
State owned aircraft company Embraer was in turn founded in 1969.  Embraer was 
created with the research and management personnel from the Research and 
Development Institute (IPD) of CTA.  The blue pints of Embraer’s first products like 
Ipanema (for agricultural works)and  Bandeirante (for civil market) were also developed 
by CTA.  Embraer initially counted on technical support from foreign companies such as 
licensing agreement with an Italian firm Aeromacchi for the production of military 
aircraft Xavante and general engineering support from Piper Aircraft Company of the 
USA.  In the 1980s, Embraer launched AMX project to produce subsonic military 
aircrafts in cooperation with a joint project with Italian Aeritalia and Aermacchi.  Such 
experience of technology learning from foreign companies were crucial for formation of 
development strategy of Embraer10.                   
 
While other import-substitution industries focused on increasing the degree of 
nationalization, Embraer pursued completely different strategy.  The company did not 
intended to deepen vertical integration but made long-term parts supply contract with 
foreign suppliers.  Instead, Embraer concentrated its effort in design and final assembly.  
Bernardes (2000) quotes Dagnino (1994) that “if the aircraft industry organization had 
insisted in nationalization of parts, the production costs could have been even prohibitive 
                                                             
10 These technical cooperation programs enabled substantial technology transfer to Embraer including training of the 
personnel in the advanced production facilities in overseas. (Cassiolato & Lastres, 2002: p.17)  
and Embraer’s market entry could have been substantially delayed (because of the small 
scale, instable market condition, less reliable quality and underdeveloped technology).”  
Only the production of fuselages was internalized because it was considered as the key 
technological area that cannot be learned from overseas. (Bernardes 2000: p.17) In other 
words, Embraer has identified itself as a final assembler with technological autonomy 
based on the capability to systemically integrate available advanced technology of the 
world. Government agencies like National Bank for Economic and Social Development 
(BNDES) and Banco do Brasil offered buyers credit to streamline the sales.  The result 
was spectacular.  The bimotor turboprop airplane Bandeirante one third of the US market 
of commuter line aircrafts with 10-20 passenger seats in the 1980s.  In the military 
market, Tucano model training airplane was widely sold to British and French air forces.     
 
Changes in local innovation system 
The overall deterioration of the macroeconomic scenario in the 1990s affected the 
government science and technology projects.  In the same way as what happened to 
CPqD in Campinas, CTA suffered reduction of resources and drain of knowledgeable 
people.  Embraer itself experienced substantial structural changes in the 1990s.  Its 
employment was cut half from the peak level of 12,000 at the end of 1980s to about 6,000 
in 1994 when Embraer was privatized.  Embraer was acquired by a financial consortium 
of an investment bank (Bozano Simonsen group) and public enterprise pension funds.   
During the state ownership period, the management board used to be consisted with 
members promoted internally but after the privatization the management board was 
replaced with external professional persons.  Employment was further reduced to less 
than 4,000.  
 
After the privatization, productive arrangement changed substantially.  Based on the 
original strategy of focusing design and system integrating assembly, Embraer sought 
risk sharing partners who take full responsibility in manufacturing of sub-systems with 
own investment sharing the commercial risk of the final product.  There the 
competitiveness of product design capability of Embraer was tested and such tenders 
attracted many internationally known enterprises.  On the other hand, through 
cooperation with global partnership Embraer acquired higher technological standard.  
The first case was the risk sharing contract with United Technologies – Sikorsky in 
development of a civil helicopter where the latter develop and produce the fuel system, 
fuel tank, and landing train.  Through this project, Embraer had first access to the 
design technique through virtual technology utilizing computer aided three-
dimensional interactive application, which turned to be technical standard of Embraer 
(Goldstein, 2002: p.108).       
 
Embraer started development project of medium-size (50 passenger seats) jet airplane 
(ERJ-145) in 1989 and the jet aircrafts but the project was stopped because of the lack 
of finance, even though the quality of its design was of high quality.  The project 
became viable thanks to the participation of four foreign companies (Gamesa, ENAer, 
SONACA, and C&D Interiors) as risk sharing partners which carried out construction 
of subsystems such as wing, subsections of fuselage, and interior11.  Embraer adapted 
the concurring engineering with real time connection via CAD/CAM with several 
project teams.  This brought substantial saving of cost both in time and money12 
(Cassiolato 2002: p.41).      
 
The regional jet market expanded in the US and Europe prompted exceptional growth of 
exports of Embraer.  The ERJ –145 jet aircraft was well accepted by the market because 
it was lighter, quieter, cheaper, and more fuel saving.  Compacter variations ERJ-140 and 
ERJ-135 were derived from the same platform of ERJ-145 to attend differentiated needs 
of customers.  It should be also remarked that even after the privatization, Embraer 
continued receiving substantial financial assistance for R&D activities from government 
agencies (FINEP and BNDES), tax incentive in the framework of PDTI, and credit and 
interest subsidies (PROEX) to buyers13.  
                                                             
11 The Spanish company Gamesa was responsible for the production of the wings, engine nacelles, fairings of the 
wing/fuselage junction and the doors of the main landing gear. Sonaca, headquartered in Belgium, committed itself 
with the production of the luggage, service and main doors located in the fuselage, besides a front and a rear section of 
the fuselage and the two motor pylons. The Chilean company ENAer produced the airplane wings and rudder controls. 
The interior of the passenger cabin and luggage compartment was developed and manufactured by C&D Interiors - one 
of the largest companies of the world in its specialty. (Cassiolato et.al. 2002, Box III) 
12 Embraer established a Virtual Reality Center with the cooperation of Silicon Graphics Inc. in 2000 with the 
investment of US$ 2.6 million. 
 
13 Canada filed a complaint to WTO that PROEX is a sort of export subsidy not allowed by WTO agreement and 
Embraer is threatening Bombardier with unfair competition.  The trade dispute was enlarged to NAFTA’s ban on 
 Taking the same steps, Embraer initiated a new project for larger (70 passenger seats) 
airplane – ERJ-170 –  in 1998.  Risk sharing partners in this project include General 
Electric, Gamesa, Hamilton Standard, Latécoère, Kawasaki Heavy Industry, Gamesa, 
Sonoca, C&D Aerospace, Parker, and Liebherr.14  According to Cassiolato et.al. (2002) 
up to 2001, about 95% of the suppliers were located abroad (p.48).  Embraer is trying to 
induce its partners and suppliers to establish production in Brazil but so far only Sonaca 
established in São José dos Campos an affiliate Sobraer. ELEB (Embraer Lebherr) is in 
São José dos Campos.   Recently, Kawasaki announced to establish a plant in Gavião 
Peixoto 
 
With the internationalization of partnerships, local factors for innovation is weakened.  
Although CTA performed fundamental role in creating Embraer, the latter do not depend 
on CTA’s research.  ITA is still considered as one of the most prestigious engineering 
school, but its graduate program is not given the highest grade.  It is also said that ITA 
cannot supply specialists at the same speed as Embraer requires (Forbes Brasil, 
25/10/2002: p.33).  Embraer created own master program “Program of Specialization in 
Engineering” in partnership with ITA and Unicamp.  .   
 
There are still small number (around 40) of locally-owned suppliers and producer service 
providers depending on subcontracting of Embraer.  Many of them were setup by former 
Embraer employees.  A SERCO (Engineering Service Cooperative) setup in 1995 by 
former engineers of Embraer as a non-profit organization.  The associated firms offer 
specialized services to Embraer and its risk sharing partners.  Owing to the recent boom 
of aircraft exports, employment level of Embraer is the highest since the beginning of 
1990s.A part of the ex-employees are retuning to Embraer’s workplace.  This existence of 
a pool of specialized labor has given Embraer a certain flexibility enabling its rapid 
growth. Availability of highly qualified engineers, in turn, has given agglomeration effect 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Brazilian beef imports.  Although it was justified on the basis of the suspect of foot and mouth disease, Brazil 
recognized it as retaliation.  The dispute was settled by WTO in favor of Brazil.     
14 GE is responsible for supplying turbines.  It then holds 99.6% stake of Celma, a suuplier of motors, accessories and 
parts, located in Petrópolis-RJ.  GE also took over Honeywell who supplies most avionics.  Gamesa supplies rear 
fuselage.  Kawasaki, from Japan, is developing the central part of the wing.  Liebherr established a joint venture with 
Embraer for the supply of the landing gear.                
to technology-based multinational firms in transport equipment and electronic sectors like 
General Motors, Volkswagen, Ericsson, Panasonic, Philips, and Kodak located in São 
Jose dos Campos and its vicinity.         
 
IV. Belo Horizonte 
 
Unlike the previous two cities, Belo Horizonte is not a specialized industrial city.  It is the 
state capital of the third largest economy in Brazil, Minas Gerais.  So, like other state 
capitals, Belo Horizonte has highly diversified economic structure with high proportion 
of service activity.  Secondly, Belo Horizonte cannot be seen as a technopolis as the 
previous two because technology-based activity is not really representative. The state is 
known for its agricultural richness and as the name of the state – the land of all mines – 
speaks, industrialization of the state was led by metal and machine industry.  Hence, in 
terms of the share in the total industrial production, heavy industries, such as the 
automobile production complex of Fiat in the outskirt of the city, are still predominant.  
In this sense, the city economy is more resource based than being technology based.  
Thirdly, Belo Horizonte did not host a large-scale mission-oriented research institution 
like CPqD in Campinas and CTA in São Jose dos Campos, through which abundant 
amount of financial resource was devoted intensively.           
 
Still, there is noticeable development of biotechnology industry15 in Belo Horizonte.  The 
fundamental vehicle has been the cumulated knowledge in UFMG (Minas Gerais Federal 
University) from which some entrepreneurial spin-off created competitive firms 
supported by local institutional arrangement.  According to FIEMG (2000), UFMG 
counts on 161 professors and researchers with PhD degree in the area of biology.  The 
non-profit organization Fundação Biominas serves as the administrative tool to gather 
newly created firms in its incubator.   
 
The first spin-off from UFMG was Biobras born by biochemist Marcos Luís dos Mares 
Guia who also founded Institute of Biology of UFMG.  The company started production 
of enzymes in 1976, then engaged in production of insulin as the joint venture with Eli 
                                                             
15 Another difference from the cases in Campinas and São Jose dos Campos is that the biotechnology is relatively new 
industry and it was never be a target of import substitution industrialization. 
Lilly (USA) in the early 1980s and dominated the domestic market in a few years.  The 
company was sold to Novo Nordisk for US$ 22 million in 2002, still holding some 
patents to establish a new enterprise Biom, specialized in development of synthetic 
insulin.           
 
The 2001 survey by Biominas Foundation identified 304 biotechnology firms creating 
about 28,000 qualified jobs among which 89 firms (29%) are located in Minas Gerais, 
being only second to São Paulo which accounted for 129 (42%). (Biominas, 2002)  In this, 
biotechnology firms in São Paulo are suppliers to multinational firms while those in 
Minas Genrais are independent and locally-owned concentrating in human health 
products.  In Belo Horizonte alone, there are 58 firms with total sales revenue of US$ 417 
million and 4,273 workplaces in 2000, engaging mainly in development of medical 
diagnostic kits (18 firms) and pharmaceuticals (11 firms).  (FIEMG 2000)   
Yet, some analysts are still skeptical whether the biotechnology industry in Minas Gerais 
is as big as to be called “a cluster”.16  They also cast a doubt that the even that size is 
exaggerated, given the fact that Biobrás and Vallée (a leading firm in veterinary products 
such as vaccine for aftose fever originated in Uberlândia, located at 550 km west to Belo 
Horizonte) has predominant weight in this subset, representing 42% of the total sales 
revenue.  Firms do not show any particular locational pattern in the city neither being 
agglomerated in particular streets or districts, nor concentrated nearby the university.  So 
it is even doubtful whether they are having any technological interaction among 
themselves.  In particular, production units of the above mentioned two firms are located 
in Montes Claros in the northern part of Minas Gerais to receive incentives for 
northeastern regional development of the federal government. 
 
Another key component of the biotechnology LSI in Belo Horizonte is Biominas 
Foundation.  Biominas was funded in 1990 as the non-profit organization for incubating 
new biotechnology firms.  It is located in the northern suburb of Belo Horizonte on the 
land conceded by the Minas Gerais State Technology Center (CETEC).  It is currently 
incubating 10 companies and 8 companies are already graduated17.  The incubator is 
                                                             
16 Interview at CEDEPLAR and Faculty of Economics of Minas Gerais Federal University on December 5, 2002. 
17 One of graduated firms Ferrara Ophthalmics produces ring to reform deformed cornea causing myopia and 
astigmatism.  The company invested R$ 1 million.  Among the incubating companies, JHS Laboratorio Quimico 
develops material of reconstruction of bones by means of powder based on carbonic calcium with the investment of 
concentrated on the second floor of the Biominas building where the space is layout for 
26 rooms of 45m2 partitioned with removable walls and common laboratory space.  The 
incubation contract is annually and renewable to four years.  One room is rent for 
R$ 20/m2, equivalent to US$6, totaling to R$900 (US$270) per room. One firm can 
occupy up to 4 rooms slots.  Each room is equipped with only basic telecommunication 
cable (telephone and internet) and purified water, whose services are charged by usage.  
Research equipment and office furniture should be brought by the rentees.  Besides the 
rental of the space, Biominas provides business support including: legal assistance to 
setup a corporation; search for funding with private and governmental institutions18.  
Biominas also provides seed money based on the loan from Multilateral Investment Fund 
of the Interamerican Development Bank (MIF-IDB).  
 
In fact, biotechnology firms are not as representative as the telecom equipment means to 
Campinas and aircraft means to São Jose dos Campos19, but it is worth visiting the case 
because it illustrates the case where technology-based industry can be established within 
the local innovation system framework even without the financial bonanza.  Because of 
the wide possibility of application and potential synergy effect to other business area (like 
fusion with electronics, creation of new materials, contribution for emission control, etc.), 
the local business community has high expectation in the potential of emerging 
biotechnology cluster.20  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
R$ 800 thousand.  Another incubating case includes Biocod Produtos & Servicos who competes in the market of 
genetic identification with its own methodology cheaper than the competitors in the domestic markets who depend on 
imported kit 
 
18 For example, Minas Gerais State Fund for Promotion of Research (FAPEMIG) associated with Development Bank of 
Minas Gerais (BDMG) and SEBRAE-MG implements PROMITEC (Financial Support Prgram for Technology Based 
Micro and Small Firms).  A beneficiary signs a contract for 24 months, renewable once, of the credit line up to 
R$ 100,000.  A beneficiary should be a research based micro and small firms aiming to develop a scientific research 
aiming at commercial application, either at setup, initial, or second-stage.  The credit has up to 18-24 months of the 
grace period, interest free (monetary correction by the consumer price index (IPC-A) is charged), repayable in up to 24-
36 installments.  It requires the guarantee by a third party.  Matching fund of 10% of the research project by the 
beneficiary if the project is in the second stage. BDMG also offers a PROINTEC (Program for the Promotion of 
Technology based Incubators) which supports incubators.  
 
19 Remember that a biotechnology is still an incipient industry for Brazil as a whole. 
20 The Federation of Industries of Minas Gerais State (FIEMG), in cooperation with McKinsey, elaborated future 
development vision of the state, in which the biotechnology cluster in Belo Horizonte was given top priority.  
 With the technological base on UFMG and supporting activity of Biominas, new firms 
are emerging.   In his own sample survey, Fajnzlber (2002) found diversified reactions to 
his questions on managers’ perceptions on their source of competitiveness and obstacles 
for growth.  Quality (product differentiation, qualified personnel, high standard of 
production facility, precision of product) is most cited as a source of their 
competitiveness.  Most of firms are implementing own R&D and also maintain contact 
(either formal or informal) with universities and exchange information with other firms.  
Yet, he found that only a small portion of firms engage in new technology seeking R&D 
and most of them are simply application of publicly available technologies.  Issues of 
common interest are discussed in the Chamber of Biotechnology Industry and Syndicate 
of Biotechnology Firms.  According to my own visit to these institutions, they discuss 
mainly about institutional matter such as government regulations.      
 
Each biotechnology firms in Belo Horizonte are still small and faces obstacles for growth.  
On the other hand, most important obstacles are access to enough demand.  Because of 
creating new products firms are feeling difficulty in creating the market obtaining 
consumers confidence.  Firms competing with multinational firms, like the case of 
medical laboratory kits, are having difficulty in competing with products with brand 
name and strong commercialization channel.  Most of them do not have access to the 
foreign markets.  Liberalization is seen as both risks and opportunities.  Risks are 
intensified competition with multinationals and chances are greater opportunities for 
subcontracting and partnerships.       
 
 
Fonseca et.al (2002) analizes that Brazil has potential in biotechnology in terms of the 
quality of the talent in universities and research institutions.  According to them, major 
obstacles are of financial nature to support R&D activities.  There are two emerging 
efforts movements.  One is private venture capital fund established by big business 
groups such as Votaorantim and Copersucar to finance new biotechnology firms.  
Another is government initiatives led by FINEP in the framework of Fundo Setorial to 
finance private R&D and joint research between firm and universities.  Since they are still 
new institutions and we do not have enough information to evaluate.  Yet, private venture 
fund, which created high-tech bubble in the USA, has never been a corporate finance 
model in Brazil.  Hence it is hard to predict that this will be a major break-thorough of the 
financial bottleneck.  Likewise, the public fund for science and technology cannot be 
sufficient due to the hard budget constraint imposed by the macroeconomic scenario.  As 
Fonseca et.al (2002) predicts, there are already some examples of successful partnership 
with big corporations which should be followed by new biotechnology firms.     
                           
In fact, Salles-Filho et.al (2001) describes that one of major characteristics of the modern 
biotechnology market is a contract of cooperation.  Biotechnology is highly research 
intensive and involves high degree of uncertainty in viability toward profitable 
commercialization.  There is a tendency that large enterprises are competing 
internationally for market share through mergers and acquisitions in seek for greater 
market power and financial strength.  They are extensively diversified both 
geographically and in product variety.  While the degree of global oligopoly has been 
increasing, they are looking for outsourcing of innovative specialized knowledge while 
minimizing the internalization of R&D cost to sustain technological competitive edge in 
the diversified activities.  In the technological frontier, therefore, so-called new 
biotechnology enterprises (NBEs) have opportunities of partnership with the big 
enterprises, mainly financial, to advance their research at their own risk.  When the 
research will reach a concrete result NBEs will let the development for 
commercialization to the global firms because they cannot compete with the latter due to 
a scale economy.  Thus, NBEs and global firms can play complementary role with each 
other.   
 
Biotechnology firms in Brazil can amplify potential of growth by pursuing such strategic 
alliances with big enterprises.  The sales of Biobrás to Novo Nordisk can be understood 
as one of the leading examples21.  The ex-president of Nordisk and current president of 
Biom says, “In the technology based industry, a success may not mean to hold a firm for 
ever, but one can actually make success by transforming from one promising business to 
another.” (Cluster, Abril/Junho 2002: p.32)       
                                                             
21 When Biobrás started commercialization of human insulin, Novo Nordisk and Eli Lilly (USA) sold their product 
below the international price to ruin the new entry.  Since Brazil levied antidumping surcharge, Novo Nordisk started 
domestic production and still tried to undercut the price of Biobrás.   
 V. Conclusions 
 
Our examination of three cases of high technology based localized industrialization in 
Brazil leads us to the following tentative conclusions: 
Technology based industry depends on the capability of the local research institutions.  
Such necessity makes the firms necessary to be located at the knowledge center.   
Interactions with industries also sharpen the capability of universities and deepen their 
expertise. 
Well-targeted public investments in R&D many have lasting result.  Creating a core 
technology in designing a creative product is an essential part. 
Materializing the research result requires uninterrupted (but not necessarily so big) seed 
money.  Government programs, private venture capital, or partnerships with large 
corporations can be such sources.  Because of financial constraint of the government and 
underdeveloped capital market, the third option turned to be frequently used. 
Brazilian technology based-firms face obstacles for growth.  Relatively successful 
companies are being acquired by foreign firms before entering the growth phase due to 
the limited capability of investment.  Because of competition with large multinational 
firms. 
Technologically autonomous and competitive firm can grow through strategic partnership 
with other companies – including multinationals, effectively reducing the financial risk 
and amplifying opportunities for learning. 
 
Our findings imply that once we will lose the local dynamics of technological learning 
between industry and universities, the industry will be a set of subcontracting and simple 
assembly of imported parts.  The financial problem continues to be a bottleneck of 
growth of technology-based firms.  Here, the legacy of underdeveloped financial market 
during the uncertain macroeconomy for many years still cast a dark shadow.  
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Table 1: Brazilian top 10 export items in 2002 at 8 digits NCM level (US dollars million) 
1. Soybeans in grain 3,029 
2. Soybean refuse from extraction of oil 2,197 
3. Iron ore, not concentrated 2,021 
4. Aircrafts weighted 2000KG<=5000KG 1,826 
5. Petroleum crude oil 1,691 
6. Automobile with engine 1500<CM3<=3000 for no more than 6 
passengers 1,486 
7. Coffee crude, not roasted, beans 1,195 
8. Sugar from sugar cane, not refined  1,111 
9. Wood paste for paper fabrication 1,109 
10. Cellular telephone  1,071 
(Source) MDIC, Aliceweb, http://alicewwb.desenvolvimento.gov.br, accessed on March 
7,2003. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Brazil: R&D expenditures by entities, 2000        
 
(Ssource)  http:/ /www.mct.gov.br,  accessed on March 17,  2003
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Table 2. Regional distribution of the creation of knowledgeable people 
Biology Engineering 
Registered Students 
Title given in the 
year Registered Students 
Title given in the 
year 
  MASTER DOCTOR MASTER DOCTOR MASTER DOCTOR MASTER DOCTOR 
North 4% 3% 4% 4% 1% 0% 1% 0% 
Northeast 10% 6% 9% 4% 9% 5% 9% 3% 
Southeast 67% 75% 64% 77% 71% 80% 68% 85% 
Rio de Janerio 17% 19% 18% 20% 20% 25% 18% 26% 
Minas Gerais 8% 7% 8% 6% 11% 6% 10% 5% 
São Paulo 40% 49% 36% 51% 38% 48% 38% 54% 
South 14% 13% 17% 13% 15% 13% 18% 12% 
Rio Grande do Sul  7% 8% 10% 5% 6% 6% 8% 5% 
Paraná 5% 4% 6% 7% 3% 1% 3% 1% 
Central-West 5% 4% 6% 3% 4% 1% 4% 0% 
Brazil   4,081    4,238    1,554       779    9,675    5,395    2,651       765  
(Source) CAPES homepage http://www.capes.gov.br 
 
